This paper presents a method to estimate the effects of a counterfactual policy intervention in the context of dynamic structural models where all the structural functions (i.e., preferences, technology, transition probabilities, and the distribution of unobservable variables) are nonparametrically specified. We show that agents' behavior, before and after the policy intervention, and the change in agents' utility are nonparametrically identified. Based on this result we propose a nonparametric procedure to estimate the behavioral and welfare effects of a general class of counterfactual policy interventions. We illustrate this method with Monte Carlo experiments in a model of capital replacement.
Introduction
Discrete choice dynamic structural models have proven useful tools for the assessment of public policy initiatives (Wolpin, 1996) . These econometric models have been applied to the evaluation of different economic policies, both factual and counterfactual, like welfare policies (Sanders and Miller, 1997, Keane and Moffit, 1998 , and , unemployment insurance (Ferrall, 1997) , social security and retirement (Berkovec and Stern, 1991 , and Rust and Phelan, 1997), patents regulation (Pakes, 1986 , and Pakes and Simpsom, 1989) , education policies Zilcha, 1994, Eckstein and Wolpin, 1999 , and Keane and Wolpin, 2001), contraceptive choice (Hotz and Miller, 1993) , regulation on labor contracts (Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego, 1999, and Rota, 2004) , programs on child poverty (Todd and Wolpin, 2003) , scrapping subsidies (Adda and Cooper, 2000) , or regulation of nuclear plants (Rust and Rothwell, 1995) .
A common feature of the econometric models in these applications is the parametric specification of structural functions like utility functions, technology, transition probabilities of state variables, and the probability distribution of unobservable variables. 1 These parametric models contrast with the emphasis on robustness and nonparametric specification that we find in other approaches to evaluate public policies. In particular, the literature on evaluation of treatment effects has emphasized the importance of a nonparametric specification of the distribution of unobservables to obtain robust results (see Robb, 1985, Manski, 1990 , and more recently Heckman and Smith, 1998 , and Heckman and Vyltacil, 1999 . Though robustness is an important argument in favor of this reduced form approach, these methods have important limitations to evaluate counterfactual policies, to estimate welfare effects, to incorporate transitional dynamics, and to allow for general equilibrium effects.
In this paper we show that it is possible to use nonparametrically specified dynamic structural models to evaluate the effects of counterfactual policy interventions. The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we show that agents' behavior, before and after the policy intervention, and the change in agents' utility are nonparametrically identified.
Second, based on this identification result we propose a nonparametric method to estimate the behavioral and welfare effects of counterfactual policy interventions in this class of mod-els. And third, we apply this method to evaluate hypothetical reforms in the rules of a public pension system using data of male blue-collar workers in Sweden. This application illustrates how the method can be used to obtain precise estimates of welfare effects, and the transitional dynamics of these effects, which do not rely on any parametric assumption on the primitives of the model.
The parametric specification of dynamic structural models is justified for the sake of parsimony, simplicity, and efficiency in the estimation. However, the economic content of dynamic structural models does not rest on the choice of a particular family of parametric functions for the primitives but on specification assumptions such as: the selection of the relevant decision and state variables; independence assumptions between unobservable variables and some observables; the stochastic structure of the transition probabilities of the state variables (e.g., which variables follow exogenous transitions, and which variables are endogenous and how); monotonicity and concavity assumptions of some primitive functions; specification of individual heterogeneity; or the equilibrium concept that is used.
As shown by Rust (1994) and Magnac and Thesmar (2002) , the differences between the utilities of two choice alternatives cannot be identified in dynamic decision models even when the researcher "knows" the time discount factor, the probability distribution of the unobservables, and the transition probabilities of the state variables. This under-identification result contrasts with the identification of utility differences in static (i.e., not forward looking) decision models (see Matzkin, 1992 ). This paper takes a different look at the problem of nonparametric identification of dynamic decision models. Instead of looking at the nonparametric identification of the utility function we consider the identification of the behavioral and welfare effects of counterfactual policy changes. More specifically, we prove the identification of agents' choice probability functions and surplus functions associated with hypothetical policy interventions. We show that knowledge of the current utility function or of utility differences is not necessary to identify these counterfactual functions. These counterfactuals depend on the distribution of unobservables and on the difference between the present value of choosing always the same alternative and the value of deviating one period from that behavior. We show that these objects are identified under similar conditions as in static models. Therefore, though agents' preferences cannot be identified, we can identify the behavioral and welfare effects associated with changes in these preferences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we set up the model, the basic assumptions and the type of counterfactual policy experiments that we want to evaluate.
Section 3 presents the identification results. In section 4 we describe the estimation procedure. The empirical application is presented in section 5. We summarize and conclude in section 6. Proofs of propositions are in the appendix.
Model 2.1 Framework and basic assumptions
Time is discrete an indexed by t. Consider an agent who has preferences defined over a sequence of states of the world from period t = 0 to t = T . A state of the world has two components: a vector of state variables s t that is predetermined before period t; and a discrete decision a t ∈ A = {0, 1, ..., J} that the agent chooses at period t. The decision at period t affects the evolution of future values of the state variables. The agent's preferences over possible sequences of states of the world can be represented by a utility function
, where β ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor and U t (a t , s t ) is the current utility function at period t. The agent has uncertainty about future values of state variables. His beliefs about future states can be represented by a sequence of Markov transition probability functions F t (s t+1 |a, s). These beliefs are rational in the sense that they are the true transition probabilities of the state variables. Every period t the agent observes the vector of state variables s t and chooses his action a t ∈ A to maximize the expected utility
Let α t (s t ) and V t (s t ) be the optimal decision rule and the value function at period t, respectively. By Bellman principle of optimality the sequence of value functions can be obtained using the recursive expression:
For the rest of the paper we adopt a notation that omits the time subindex from functions and variables. We can include the time period t as a state variable of the model and therefore we can omit it as an index in the structural functions, in the optimal decision rule and in the value function. Note that a finite-horizon dynamic decision problem can be represented as an infinite-horizon problem if we just make the utility functions equal to zero for any state with t > T . We also omit the time subindex in the decision and state variables and use (a, s)
to represent current values of these variables, and (a 0 , s 0 ) for next period values.
From the point of view of the observing researcher there are three types of state variables.
That is, s = (x, ω, ε) where: the vector x is observable to the researcher; the vector ε is unobservable; and the vector ω is unobservable but it can be inferred by the econometrician using data of a vector of outcome variables y and estimating the system of outcome equations:
where y is a q × 1 vector of variables and h (., ., .) is a vector of q functions. For instance, in a model of firm behavior the researcher may observe a component of the profit function such as output, revenue or the wage bill. If y is firm's output then h (a, x, ω) would be a production function and ω a productivity shock. In a model of individual behavior where individuals maximize a utility that depends on consumption and leisure, the econometrician may observe individual earnings. In that case h (a, x, ω) would be an earnings function and ω is a shock in earnings.
Without loss of generality we can write the one-period utility as the sum of two components:
where u(a, x, ω) ≡ E (U(a, x, ω, ε) | a, x, ω) and ε(a, x, ω) ≡ U(a, x, ω, ε)−u(a, x, ω). For the sake of notational simplicity we use ε(a) instead of ε(a, x, ω), and the vector ε to represent {ε(a) : a ∈ A}. By definition, the random variables in ε have zero mean and are mean independent of x and ω.
We consider the following assumptions on the joint distribution of the state variables.
The cumulative transition probability of the state variables factors as:
where F ω (.|ω), F ε (.|x) and F x (.|a, x) are distribution functions. That is: (a) ω follows an exogenous Markov process; (b) future ε 0 s may depend on future values of x (e.g., heterocedasticity) but not on current values of a or x; and (c) future values of x depend on current values of x and current actions but not on current values of ω and ε. Furthermore:
is continuously differentiable and strictly increasing with support the Euclidean space; and (e) ω is a vector of continuous random variables and for any ω 0 , ω 1 and w 0 with
Assumption 1 is based on Rust's conditional independence assumption (Rust, 1994 ), but it is more general than Rust's because it allows for the unobservable ω. Under this assumption the optimal decision rule α(x, ω, ε) can be described as:
where v(a, x, ω) is the present value of current and future utilities when current choice is a.
That is,
The functions v(0, x, ω), v(1, x, ω), ..., v(J, x, ω) are called conditional choice value functions.
The optimal decision rule represents individuals' behavior. Individuals' welfare is given by the value function V (x, ω, ε) = max a∈A { v(a, x, ω) + ε(a) }.
For our econometric analysis it is convenient to define versions of these functions which are integrated over the unobservables in ε. The optimal choice probability function is defined as:
The integrated valued function (Rust, 1994 ) S(x, ω) is defined as:
To complete the model structure we should establish the relationship between the outcome variables in y and the utility function. Assumption 2 establishes that that the utility function u (a, x, ω) is additive in the outcome variables and in other component that does not depend on the outcome variables.
ASSUMPTION 2:
The utility function u(a, x, ω) has the following form:
where ψ(.) is a 1 × q vector of positive valued functions, i.e., ψ(x) = (ψ 1 (x), ..., ψ q (x)) with ψ j (x) > 0 for any j and any x ∈ X; y is the q × 1 vector of outcome variables that we have defined in equation (3); and c(., .) is a real valued function.
The set of structural functions that define the model is {ψ, h, c, β, F ω , F ε , F x }. This is the so called model structure. This paper concentrates in binary choice models, though our identification results and the estimation method can be generalized to the multinomial case.
Consider the binary choice case where a ∈ {0, 1}. For notational simplicity we use P (x, ω)
to denote P (1|x, ω).
An example: A model of retirement behavior
In this section we present a model of retirement behavior similar to the one in Rust and Phelan (1997) . Individuals have a utility function that is additively separable in consumption (C t ) and leisure (L t ). The marginal utilities of consumption and leisure may depend on individual characteristics such as age, marital status, family size, health status, etc. Some of these demographic variables are observable to the researcher (i.e., they are in the vector x t ) but some of them are unobservables (i.e., they are in ε t ). More specifically,
where the functions ψ C (x t ) and ψ L (x t , ε t ) capture individual heterogeneity in marginal utilities.
Every month t the individual decides whether to continue working (a t = 1) or to retire from the labor force (a t = 0). If the individual works, his hours of leisure are equal to T (x t )−H(x t ) and his monthly earnings (Y t ) are equal to labor earnings (W t ). If the individual decides to retire, then his hours of leisure are T (x t ) and earnings are equal to retirement benefits (B t ). Thus, we can write L t = T (x t ) − a t H(x t ) and monthly earnings as:
Labor earnings during the month are uncertain to the individual when he decides whether to retire. Suppose that W t = exp{w(x t ) + ω t+1 }, such that: w(.) is a function, and ω t is a variable that follows a Markov process ω t+1 = κ(ω t ) + e t+1 where κ(.) is a function and e t+1 is the innovation of the process. The individual knows x t and ω t but he does not know the innovation e t+1 when he makes his decision.
Retirement benefits depend on retirement age (ra t ) and on pension points (pp t ): B t = B(ra t , pp t ). The form form of the function B(., .) depends on the rules of the pension system.
For instance, a very standard structure is:
if ra t < ra min pp t (1 + τ 1 (ra t − ra * )) if ra min ≤ ra t < ra * pp t (1 + τ 2 (ra t − ra * )) if ra t ≥ ra * (13) where ra min , ra * , τ 1 and τ 2 are policy parameters that characterize the function b(., .). More specifically: ra min is the minimum retirement age; ra * is the "normal" retirement age; τ 1 is a permanent actuarial reduction in benefits per month of early retirement; and τ 2 is a permanent actuarial increase in benefits per month of delayed retirement. In Sweden, the values of these parameters are ra min = 60 year, ra * = 65 years, τ 1 = 0.5% and τ 2 = 0.7%.
Pension points are a deterministic function of past earnings history. However, it turns out that for most systems the transition rule of pension points can be very closely approximated by a Markov process. For instance, that is the case for social security pensions in US (see Phelan, 1997, and Rust et al, 2000) , for Germany (see Knaus, 2002) , and for Sweden (see Karlstrom, Palme and Svensson, 2004) . The variables ra t and pp t are part of the vector of observable state variables in x t .
Since the individual has uncertainty about current labor earnings, the relevant current utility is the expected utility E t (U t ) where the information set at period t is (a t , x t , ω t , ε t ).
Suppose that consumption is proportional to earnings, with a proportionality constant that may depend on the state variables in x t : i.e., C t = λ(x t ) Y t . And suppose that the function U C (.) is known. For instance, consider a constant relative risk aversion utility function
, where the parameter γ is known to the researcher. Then, we can write the utility function as:
Define the functions ψ(
. Then, we can write current utility as:
To show that this utility conforms to Assumptions 1 and 2, we still have to show that y t is observable to the econometrician, and that we can write y t as a function h(a t , x t , ω t 
with δ ≡ ln (E (exp{γe t+1 })). We know describe how w(.), κ(.) and δ can be nonparametrically identified. Given that ln W t = w(x t ) + κ(ω t ) + e t+1 , and ω t = ln W t−1 − w(x t−1 ), we can write:
The innovation e t+1 is unknown to the individual when he makes his decision. Therefore, e t+1 is independent of a t , and it is also independent of x t , x t−1 and W t−1 . The orthogonality conditions E (e t+1 |a t = 1, x t , x t−1 , W t−1 ) = 0 provide moment conditions that allow us to estimate nonparametrically the functions w(.) and κ (.). Then, we can use the residuals of e t+1 to obtain an estimate of the parameter δ, i.e.,δ = ln ((1/n) P n i=1 exp{γê i,t+1 }).
Policy interventions
We want to evaluate the behavioral and welfare effects of an hypothetical policy intervention that modifies the current utility function. More specifically, we are interested in the evaluation of policies that modify the outcome functions such as the new (counterfactual) outcome functions become h * (a, x, ω). That is,
where h and h * are the outcome functions before and after the policy intervention, respectively. The function τ represents the policy intervention and it is known to the researcher.
Note that τ may depend on choice and state variables in a completely unrestricted way. We provide several examples to illustrate how general is this class of policy interventions. When we assume that the weighting function ψ(x) is constant (i.e., ψ(x) = 1), then the class of counterfactual policies that we can evaluate using the method in this paper becomes more general. While this assumption seems quite strong for models of individual behavior, it can be more plausible for models of firm behavior where firms are assumed to maximize profits. Under this assumption, we provide identification results for any counterfactual policy intervention such that u * (a, x, ω) = u(a, x, ω) + τ (a, x, ω), where the function τ is known to the researcher, though the functions u and u * are unknown.
Let P * be the optimal choice probability function associated with the counterfactual structure. The difference between the functions P * and P represents the behavioral effects of the policy from the point of view of the econometrician. Similarly, the difference between the functions S * (x, ω) and S(x, ω) represents the welfare effects of the policy, where
is the integrated value function after the policy intervention. We are interested in the nonparametric estimation of the functions P * and S * − S.
Identification
Suppose that we have a random sample of individuals with information on the variables {a t , a t+1 , x t , x t+1 , y t , y t+1 } at some period t. As usual, we study identification with a very large (i.e., infinite) sample of individuals. Furthermore, we assume that the sample has variability over the whole support of the observable variables: A×X 2 ×Y 2 . This assumption of full-support variation is needed to identify the reduced form of the model. We assume that the outcome function h(., ., .) is identified without having to estimate the decision model.
There are different conditions under which one can consistently estimate wage equations or production functions using instrumental variables or control function approaches which do not require the estimation of the complete structural model. We have provided an example of this in the retirement model in previous section 2.3.
The outcome function h(a, x, ω) is a real valued function such that: (a) it is identified; (b) it is invertible with respect to ω, such that we can get
is strictly increasing in ω; and (e) for any x ∈ X there exits ω ∈ Ω such that
It is clear that we can identify the transition probability function F x on A × X 2 from the transition probabilities Pr(x t+1 |a t , x t ) in the data. Under Assumptions 3(a) and 3(b)
the values of ω can be consistently estimated and we can treat ω as (indirectly) observable.
Therefore, F ω is also identified on Ω × Ω. It is also clear that we can identify the choice probability function P (x, ω) on X × Ω from the probabilities Pr(a t = 1|x t , ω t ) in the data.
However, without further restrictions, we cannot identify the structural functions {ψ, c, F ε }. This is the case both in decision models where agents are forward looking (i.e., β > 0) and in models where agents are myopic (i.e., β = 0). In this paper we are not interested in the identification of {ψ, c, F ε } but in the functions P * and S * − S associated with a counterfactual policy intervention that modifies the outcome function from h to h * .
We show that, under Assumptions 1 to 3, these functions are identified. For the sake of presentation, we start showing identification in a myopic version of the model.
Myopic model
Suppose that agents are not forward looking, i.e., β = 0. Then, the counterfactual choice probability function is:
, and Fε(.|x) is the CDF of the random variableε ≡ (ε(0) − ε(1))/ψ(x) conditional to x. Equation (19) illustrates that the identification of P * (.) requires one to identify the functions Fε andc.
The relationship between these functions and the factual reduced form probability function P is:
Proposition 1 establishes the nonparametric identification of the functions Fε andc and therefore of the counterfactual probability function P * .
PROPOSITION 1: Letũ(X × Ω) ⊆ R be the space of real values that the functionh(x, ω) + c(x) can take. Under Assumptions 1 to 3, β = 0, and median(ε|x) = 0 we have that:
(a) the functionc(.) is identified on X; (b) the function Fε(.|.) is identified over the set u(X × Ω) × X; and (c) the counterfactual choice probability function P * is identified over
The counterfactual probability function is identified on the set (X ×Ω) * that is included in X ×Ω. There are different cases in which (X × Ω) * = X × Ω. Case 1:ũ(X × Ω) = R. This is the case when the range of variation of the functionh(., .), or of the functionc(.), is the whole real line. Then,ũ(X × Ω) = R and this implies that (X × Ω)
unbounded from above (below) andh * −h is positive (negative) valued. This is the case in applications where the outcome variable y has a lower bound at zero (e.g., output, earnings, revenue), and we consider a counterfactual policy that increases (decreases) the outcome variable for any possible value of (x, ω). For instance, a increase in the returns to schooling.
That is, the policy that we want to evaluate is such that it reduces (increases) the utility differential in states where this differential is large (small).
Proposition 2 establishes the identification of the welfare effect function
PROPOSITION 2: Under the conditions in Proposition 1 the welfare effect function ∆ is nonparametrically identified. We can obtain this function as:
where G (P, Fε|x) is McFadden's surplus function:
and F −1 ε (.|x) is the inverse function of Fε(.|x).
Dynamic model
We now consider the identification of counterfactual choice probabilities when agents are forward looking, i.e., when β > 0. The factual choice probability function is:
is the differential value function. The counterfactual choice probability function is P * (x, ω) = Fε(ṽ * (x, ω)|x), whereṽ * is the differential value function after the policy change. We show in this section that the functions Fε,ṽ * and P * are identified under the same conditions as in Proposition 1.
There is a main difference between the static and the dynamic models in the identification of behavioral effects. In the dynamic model we cannot identify current utility differences or any other function that depends only on preferences and not on agent's beliefs. That is, we cannot separate agents' preferences and agents' beliefs. Despite this under-identification of preferences, we can identify counterfactual choice probabilities.
For the sake of clarity, it is useful to describe our identification results in two steps. First, we show the identification of P * when the function Fε is known. Second, we prove the joint identification of Fε andṽ * .
Identification of behavioral effects when Fε is known
Suppose that the function Fε is known to the researcher. Then, it is clear that the functioñ v is identified from the factual choice probabilities: i.e.,ṽ(x, ω) = F −1 ε (P (x, ω)|x). However, in contrast to the static case, knowledge of the functionṽ is not enough to identify the counterfactualṽ * . The reason is thatṽ * is not just a function ofṽ and h * − h as in the static case. To obtainṽ * we need more information than just the factual value differenceṽ. We show here that we can identify separately two components ofṽ. Given this decomposition we can construct the counterfactual functionṽ * . Proposition 3 provides a characterization of the choice probability function that will be useful to identify and to estimate the counterfactuals.
The optimal choice probability function P is the unique fixed point of the mapping Ψ(P ), where
and (1)φ(x, ω) = ϕ(1, x, ω) − ϕ(0, x, ω), where ϕ(a, x, ω) is the value of choosing alternative a today and then select alternative 0 forever in the future; and (2)δ(x, ω, P ) = δ(1, x, ω, P )− δ(0, x, ω, P ), where δ(a, x, ω, P ) is the value of behaving optimally in the future minus the value of choosing always alternative 0, given that the current choice is a. These functions are recursively defined as follows:
where G (P, Fε|x) has the same definition as in Proposition 2.
Proposition 3 establishes that we can decompose additively the value functionṽ in two functions :φ andδ. These two functions are not arbitrary. In particular, we show below that we can identify the functionφ andδ and that these functions, together with Fε are all what we need to construct the counterfactualsṽ * and P * .
We now prove the identification of the functionφ when the distribution Fε is known.
First, given Fε it is clear from that the surplus function G (., Fε) is identified. Second, for any vector of probabilities P , equation (26) defines implicitly δ as the unique fixed point of a contraction mapping. Given G and β, this contraction mapping is known and therefore δ is also identified. And third, the optimal choice probability function is the only function that solves the functional equation: P (x, ω) = Fε(φ(x, ω) +δ(x, ω, P )). Given that Fε is invertible and thatδ(., ., P ) = δ(1, ., ., P ) − δ(0, ., ., P ) is known, we can identifyφ as:
The functions δ, andφ depend on agents' preferences and beliefs. Can we separately identify preferences and beliefs? No, without further restrictions. An assumption that identifies the utility function is the "normalization" u(0, x, ω) = 0 for any (x, ω). Under this assumption we have thatφ(x) = u(1, x, ω). This type of "normalization" is innocuous in static models because it does not affect the estimation of counterfactual probabilities, which only depend on utility differences and not on utility levels. However, this normalization is not innocuous in dynamic models. In dynamic models, the counterfactual choice probabilities depend on utility levels and not only on utility differences.
Proposition 4 shows that given the distribution function Fε we can identify the counterfactual choice probability function.
PROPOSITION 4: Suppose that the discount factor β, the distribution function Fε, and the optimal choice probability function P are known. Then, the counterfactual choice probability function P * is identified. In particular, P * is the unique fixed point of the mapping Ψ * (P ),
where
The functionsφ andδ are the same ones as in the "factual" mapping Ψ(P ) and they are identified from the factual choice probabilities. The function T only depends on the policy intervention and it can be obtained using the expression:
Identification of behavioral effects when Fε is unknown
Under Assumptions 2 and 3 we can decompose the function ϕ in two components, ϕ(a, x, ω) = Y (a, x, ω) + C(a, x) where the functions Y and C are implicitly defined by the recursive expressions:
Therefore, the fixed point mapping Ψ(P ) can be written as:
given the identification of h, the functionỸ is identified. If the functionδ were known the proof of identification of the probability distribution Fε would be very similar to the one in Proposition 1 for the static model. However,δ depends on Fε that is the object that we want to identify. Therefore, we have a "chicken-egg" problem we need to knowδ to identify Fε but we need Fε to obtainδ. If this problem has a unique fixed point, then the distribution of unobservable state variables is nonparametrically identified.
To show that Fε is identified we proceed in the following way. First, we show that the differential value functionṽ can be described as the unique fixed point of a mapping that depends only on the data and the discount factor β. This fixed point mapping Λ(ṽ) is defined as:
The functionω(x) is the value of ω that solves the equationṽ(x, ω) = 0. Since the median ofε is zero, we have that Fε(ṽ(x,ω(x))|x) = 0.5 and P (x,ω(x)) = 0.5. Therefore, we can obtainω(x) by solving the equation P (x, ω) = 0.5 with respect to ω. Note that the functioñ δ now has as arguments the functions P andṽ. This is because this function is based on a representation of the surplus function in terms of he functions P andṽ. More specifically,
Proposition 5 shows that the mapping Λ is identified givenỸ and P and that it is a contraction mapping. This Proposition also establishes that the functionsν, Fε andφ are nonparametrically identified.
PROPOSITION 5: Suppose that Assumptions 1 to 3 hold and that the discount factor β, the functionỸ , and the choice probability function P are known. Then, the mapping Λ is identified and it is a contraction mapping. It follows that the functionsṽ andφ are identified on X × Ω, and that the probability distribution Fε is identified onν(X × Ω) × X, wherẽ
Proposition 6 shows that the counterfactual probability function is nonparametrically identified and describes the procedure to compute this function.
PROPOSITION 6: Suppose that Assumptions 1 to 3 hold and that the discount factor β, the functionỸ , and the choice probability function P are known. Then, the counterfactual probability function P * is identified. More specifically, P * is the unique fixed point of the mapping Ψ * defined in Proposition 4, where the functionsφ and Fε that appear in the definition of this mapping have been identified as we describe in Proposition 5.
Proposition 7 establishes the identification of the welfare effect function ∆ ≡ (S * − S) /ψ.
PROPOSITION 7:
Under the conditions in Proposition 6 the welfare effect function ∆ ≡ (S * − S) /ψ is identified. We can get this function as:
Estimation method
This section presents a nonparametric procedure for the estimation of counterfactual choice probabilities that is based on the previous identification results. Suppose that we have a random sample of the agents' decisions, state variables and outcome variable at two consecutive periods. We use the subindex i to represent an observation for agent i. The sample size is n. We describe here a nonparametric procedure for the estimation of the functions P * and ∆.
Step 1: Estimation of the outcome function h and the transition probabilities F ω and F x .
Once we have estimated h, we can obtain the value of ω as residuals:
We use these residuals at the two consecutive periods to estimate the transition probability function F ω using a kernel method. Similarly, we estimate the transition function F x .
Step 2: Estimation of the choice probability function P . We use a estimator that guarantees the smoothness and monotonicity of the estimator with respect to ω. In particular, we use the isotonic-smooth (IS) kernel estimator proposed by Mukerjee (1988) and Mammen (1991) and extended by Mukerjee and Stern (1994) to models with multiple explanatory variables.
The estimator can be defined in two steps. Suppose that the observations have been sorted with respect to the variable ω, such that ω 1 ≤ ω 2 ≤ ... ≤ ω n . The first step is an isotonic regression for {a i } on {ω i }:P
The second step introduces smoothing by using a Nadaraya-Watson kernel estimator where the dependent variable is the isotonic regression {P I (x i , ω i )} and the explanatory variable is
where b n is the bandwidth. This estimator was first proposed by Mukerjee (1988) . This estimator is always a smooth function and, when the kernel function is symmetric with maximum at zero, it is necessarily a non-decreasing function. It is consistent, asymptotically normal and first order asymptotically equivalent to the Nadaraya-Watson estimator.
Therefore, the monotonicity restriction does not improve the first order asymptotics of the estimator. Mammen (1991) derived a second order approximation to the variance and bias of this estimator and showed that imposing the monotonicity restriction does reduces the finite where the cross-validation function is defined as if the dependent variable were the isotonic regression {P I (x i , ω i )}.
Step 3: Estimation of the functionω. The functionω, from X into Ω, is defined as the value of ω that solves the equation P (x, ω) = 0.5. Given our estimateP IS of P , we use Newton's method to findω(x). Strict monotonicity of our estimatorP IS (x, .), implies thatω(x) is unique and Newton's method always converges to this unique value.
Step 5: Estimation of the mapping Λ and the functionṽ. The mapping Λ is defined in equation (32) . Given our estimates in Steps 1 to 3, we can construct a consistent estimate of this mapping. This estimate is also a contraction mapping and its unique fixed point is a consistent estimator of the value functionṽ.
Step 6: Estimation of the distribution function Fε. Our estimator of the functionṽ is continuous and strictly increasing in ω. Therefore, there is an inverse functionṽ −1 (x, v) such that, for any (x, v) ∈ X ×ṽ(X × Ω), we have thatṽ(x,ṽ −1 (x, v)) = v. The model implies that P (x, ω) = Fε(ṽ(x, ω)). Therefore, it is clear that for any (x, v) ∈ X ×ṽ(X × Ω) we can obtain Fε(v|x) as P (x,ṽ −1 (x, v)). Thus, our estimator of Fε is:
whereṽ −1 (x, v) is our estimator of the inverse function ofṽ. For every value of x, the valuẽ v −1 (x, v) can be easily obtained using Newton's method. Again, the strict monotonicity of v(x, .) guarantees that Newton's method always converges toṽ −1 (x, v).
Step 7: Estimation of the functionsδ,C andφ. Givenṽ andFε, we have just to follow the definition ofδ to obtain an estimator of this function. We know thatφ(x, ω) =Ỹ (x, ω) + C(x). By definition ofω(x), we have thatC(x) = −Ỹ (x,ω(x)) −δ(x,ω(x)). Therefore, our estimator of the functionC is just the application of this formula using our estimates ofỸ , ω andδ. Then, the estimator ofφ isỸ +Ĉ, whereĈ is the estimator ofC.
Step 8: Estimation of the mapping Ψ * and the functions P * and ∆. Given our estimate ofφ,δ and Fε we can construct a consistent estimator of the mapping Ψ * that we defined in Proposition 3. This mapping is a contraction and its unique fixed point is a consistent estimator of P * . Finally, we apply the formula that defines the function ∆ is Proposition 7
to obtain a consistent estimator of the welfare effect function.
The main computational cost in this procedure comes from the computation of the fixed points of the contraction mappingsΛ andΨ * . This cost is equivalent to solving the dynamic programming problem twice. It is of the same order of magnitude as estimating a parametric version of the model using the two-step method in Hotz and Miller (1993) , or the nested pseudo likelihood algorithm in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002) . The Monte Carlo experiments in the next section provide an idea of the simplicity of this method. For a model with two state variables, 10, 000 cells in the state space, and 1, 000 observations, the CPU time of the whole method was less than six seconds using a program written in GAUSS language and an Intel Pentium processor of 2.2MHz. Though the computational cost increases exponentially with the number of cells in the state space, it is clear that we can use this method for any dynamic programming model that we can solve once in a reasonable amount time.
We do not derive in this paper the asymptotic distribution of our estimator of P * . However, this estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal under standard regularity conditions. The Nadaraya-Watson estimator of P is consistent, and the estimators in steps 3 to 8 are continuous and differentiable functions of the estimatorP IS . Therefore, all these estimators are consistent. The derivation of the rate of convergence of (P * − P * ) is a more complicated problem that we do not consider in this paper. In any case, the computation of a consistent estimator of the asymptotic variance using a delta method is a complicated task. Furthermore, it is likely that this asymptotic variance is not a good approximation to the finite sample variance. In this context, a bootstrap method could be a most convenient and precise method to estimate the variance of this estimator.
Monte Carlo Experiment
This section presents a Monte Carlo experiment where we apply the previous nonparametric method to evaluate the effects of a subsidy to early machine replacement using a machine replacement model. The main purpose of this experiment is to illustrate the application of the method and to show that it can provide precise estimates of some summary statistics of policy effect. The model that we present here is similar to the one in Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power (1999). Consider a firm that produces a good using capital and some perfectly flexible inputs. Output depends on the stock of capital K t , the amount of variable inputs, and a shock to total factor productivity ω t . The profit function in this model is an indirect profit where we have already solved the optimal amounts of variable inputs. Given the productivity shock and the capital stock, the firm decides whether to replace the existing capital with a new machine or continuing with the same capital for another period. Let a t ∈ {0, 1} be the indicator of the machine replacement decision. If the producer decides not to replace, the machine depreciates at rate λ such that K t = (1 − λ) K t−1 . If the producer chooses replacement, then the capital stock associated with a new machine is K t = 1. Therefore, there is a deterministic relationship between the age of capital and the capital stock. Let x t ∈ {1, 2, ...} be the age of the installed capital at the beginning of period t. Then, the transition of x t is simply x t+1 = 1 + (1 − a t )x t and K t = (1 − λ) (1−a t )x t . The productivity shock follows an exogenous Markov process with transition probability function F ω (ω t+1 |ω t ).
Machine replacement model
The profit function has the following form:
y(., .) is the production function. mc((1 − a t )x t ) + ε 1t is the machine maintenance cost, that depends on the age of capital through the function mc(.). The term ε 1t is a random shock in the maintenance cost that is unobservable to the researcher. rc(x t ) + ε 2t is the replacement cost net of the scrapping value of the retired capital. The term ε 2t is a random shock in the replacement cost that is also unobservable to the researcher. Following the notation in the paper, we have that ε t (0) = −ε 1t , ε t (1) = −ε 1t − ε 2t , and:
We are interested in evaluating the effects of a counterfactual policy that modifies firms' replacement costs. This policy tries to promote the retirement of old capital by providing a subsidy that depends on the age of the retired capital. The amount of the subsidy, that coincides with the change in the current profit function associated with the policy, is: capital. This type of policy has been common in many countries and it has been motivated as part of an environmental policy to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide. Figures 1 and 2 present the probability of replacement and the steady-state distribution of age for our model before the policy intervention. The average probability of replacement is 19%, the average age of capital is 2.42 years, and only 2.5% of the replacements occur at ages above 5 years of age.
Experiment Design
The second panel in Table 1 presents the policy that we want to evaluate. This policy has the form described in equation (40) . It is a subsidy to firms that replace their machine at ages between 3 and 5 years. The maximum subsidy is obtained when replacement occurs at the third year, and the amount of subsidy is 12% of the price of a new machine (i.e., 0.12 * p BUY ). The subsidy decreases when the machine gets older such that it is 8% of the price of a new machine in the fourth year, 4% in the fifth year, and no subsidy for older ages.
Figures 3 and 4 present the effect of this policy on the probability of capital replacement and on the age distribution. The probability of replacement decreases at ages lower than 3 years because the new policy creates an incentive to delay replacement in order to get the subsidy. However, the policy increases the probability of retirement at any age greater or equal than 3 years. Overall the policy encourages early machine replacement. The average age of a machine in steady state goes from 2.42 years to 2.07 years. Aggregate productivity in steady state increases by 2.69%.
In the Monte Carlo experiment we use 1, 000 replications of a cross section of 1, 000 firms.
To construct each of these cross sections we take random draws of (x, ω) from the joint steadystate distribution of these variables. Given these draws we generate the replacement decisions by taking random draws from a Bernoulli with probability P (x, ω). Figures 5 and 6 present frequency estimates of the age distribution and the probability of replacement conditional on age for a typical sample in this Monte Carlo experiment. The 95% confidence bands illustrate that conditional on the machine age there is still very significant heterogeneity or sample variability in firms' replacement decisions.
Some estimation issues
All the functions have been estimated over a discrete and finite set of values of the state variables. The range of values for the age of capital consists of the integers between 0 and the maximum age observed in the sample plus one, i.e., typically the integers between 0 and 11. For the productivity shock we consider a uniform grid with 600 cells over the interval
, where s ω is the sample standard deviation of the productivity shock. In a sample of 1, 000 observations we typically find several observations out of the interval [−3s ω , 3s ω ].
However, it is very unlikely to observe values greater in absolute value than four times the standard deviation. Therefore, we do some extrapolation outside the support of ω in the sample. As we explain below, we need this extrapolation to estimate the function m. We exploit the continuity and monotonicity of P with respect to ω to do this extrapolation. Figure 7 presents the functionỸ (x, ω). This function represents the present value of output if the machine is replaced today and then it is never replaced again in the future, minus the present value of output if the machine is not replaced neither today or in the future.
Given the specification of the production technology, the functionỸ is strictly increasing in both arguments.
Following the description of the estimation procedure in section 4, the first step consists in the estimation of the choice probability function P (x, ω) ≡ E(a i |ω i = ω, x i = x) using a Nadaraya-Watson estimator. For the sake of computational simplicity we use Silverman's rule of thumb to choose the value of the bandwidths for the two conditioning variables. Given the Nadaraya-Watson estimates, we impose monotonicity with respect to x and ω using the method in Mukerjee and Stern (1994) . Figures 8 presents the true and the estimated replacement probability function for three different values of the productivity shock. We also report bootstraped confidence intervals. There are two important features to comment on these estimates. First, note that the amplitude of the confidence intervals here is smaller than in the frequency estimates in Figure 6 . There are three factors that contribute to the narrowing of the confidence intervals: (1) we are conditioning not only on age but also on the productivity shock and this reduces the variance of the residuals; (2) the kernel estimator imposes smoothness and this reduces the variance of the estimator, though it also introduces a finite sample bias; and (3) imposing monotonicity also reduces the variance of the estimator.
A second important feature of these estimates is that they are biased for values of age lower than 2 or greater than 6. The true replacement probability is outside the 95% confidence interval for these values of age. The reason of this bias is that our criterion for the choice of bandwidth (i.e., Silverman's rule of thumb) introduces over-smoothing in our estimates.
Though we could eliminate this over-smoothing by using a cross-validation method to choose the bandwidth, we prefer to analyze the performance of our estimator when we have certain over-smoothing because this is a common scenario in kernel estimation. Figure 9 presents the steady-state age distribution induced by the Nadaraya-Watson estimate of the choice probability function. 3 We also report the true age distribution and bootstraped confidence intervals. This estimate is also significantly more precise that the raw frequency estimate in Figure 5 . Note that the bias inP does not have important effects on the estimation of the steady-state age distribution.
In the second step of the procedure, we useP to estimate the function m. It is in this step where we need estimates of the P function for values of ω outside the range of variation in a typical sample. The reason is that for x > 8 we need very large values of the productivity shock in order to haveP (x, ω) = 0.5. Similarly, for x < 3 the values of ω that solve the equationP (x, ω) = 0.5 are very small. Figure 10 presents the true and the estimated m function for a typical sample.
Results of the experiment
The main results of the Monte Carlo experiment are presented in Figures 11 to 14 and in Table 2 . The two estimated functions that play the most important role in the estimation of the policy effects areC and Fε. Figure 11 presents the true functionC and the quantiles 2.5%, 50%, and 97.5% in the Monte Carlo distribution of the estimated function. Though the estimation is precise, there is finite sample bias. This bias might be due to over-smoothing in the estimation of the replacement probability, but it might be also a more general property of our estimator that appears even we use cross-validation in the estimation of P . That is, the estimatorĈ is a very nonlinear function of the estimatorP , and though it is consistent it can be biased for relatively small samples. Figure 12 presents the Monte Carlo distribution of the estimate of the standard deviation ofε. There is also a very clear upward bias in this estimation.
Though, by construction, the upward biases in the estimates ofC and Fε.compensate with each other in the estimation of the factual choice probability P , that is not necessarily the case in the estimation of the counterfactual P * . Figures 13 and 14 show that the estimator of the counterfactual (steady-state) age distribution is not biased. The estimated counterfactual is close to the true one, both in terms of median and of dispersion. Table 2 presents more aggregate measures of the estimated policy effects on average age and productivity. The factual average age of capital and the average productivity are estimated without any bias, but there is a small upward bias in the estimated counterfactuals.
Despite this bias, the estimated effects are very precise and close to the true effects.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper presents a nonparametric approach to evaluate the behavioral effects of counterfactual policies using dynamic discrete decision models. Though agents' preferences cannot be nonparametrically identified in this class of models, we show that the behavioral effects of counterfactual changes in preferences are identified under similar conditions as in static models. Our results apply both to finite horizon and infinite horizon decision processes.
Based on this identification result we propose a nonparametric procedure to estimate the behavioral effects of counterfactual experiments in this class of models. The computational cost of this method is equivalent to solving the dynamic programming problem twice (i.e., before and after the policy change). We have analyzed the ability of this method to provide informative estimates of policy effects using a Monte Carlo experiment. In this experiment we evaluate the effects of an investment subsidy program in the context of a model of machine replacement. Using a sample with 1, 000 observations we find a small finite sample bias in the estimates of some policy effects. Despite this bias, the method provides precise estimates of the actual policy effects.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.
[1] The factual choice probability function is:
he function P (., .) is identified on X × Ω. Furthermore, by Assumptions 1(d) and 3(d), this probability function is strictly monotonic in ω. Define the function ω * (x, u) from X×ũ(X×Ω)
into Ω such that ω * (x, u) is the value of ω that solves the equationh(x, ω) +c(x) = u.
Assumption 3(d) implies that ω * (., .) exits is a well-defined function on X ×ũ(X × Ω).
Assumption 3(e) implies that, for any x ∈ X, the pair (x, 0) belongs to X ×ũ(X × Ω). Since median(ε|x) = 0, we have that P (x, ω * (x, 0)) = 0.5. Identification and invertibility of P (., .)
implies that ω * (x, 0) is identified for any x ∈ X. Given ω * (x, 0) we can identifyc(x) as:
Therefore, the functionc(.) is identified on X.
[2] Now, we prove the identification of Fε. Given that we knowc(.), we can obtain ω * (x, u)
as the value of ω that solves the equation:
Then, by construction we have that for (x, u) ∈ X ×ũ(X × Ω),
Thus, Fε is identified on X ×ũ(X × Ω).
[3] The counterfactual choice probability function is P * (x, ω) = Fε
Given that h * is known and Fε andc are identified, it is clear that P * (x, ω) is identified at any pair (x, ω) such thath * (x, ω) +c(x) ∈ũ(X × Ω).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. Using the definition of the integrated value function,
we have that the welfare effect function is:
And given that the optimal choice probability function P (x, ω) is Fε(h(x, ω) +c(x)|x) and that Fε(.|x) is invertible, we have that:
Thus,
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. For notational simplicity we use z to denote the pair (x, ω) and the function F (z 0 |a, z) to represent F ω (ω 0 |ω)F x (x 0 |a, x).
[1] Given the definition of the surplus function G(P, Fε|z), we have that:
Solving this expression in equation (7) that defines the conditional choice value function v(a, z), we have that:
We can apply the same decomposition to the value v(0, z 0 )/ψ(x 0 ) that appears in this expression. If we do this, we get:
If we continue applying the decomposition to v(0, z 00 )/ψ(x 00 ), v(0, z 000 )/ψ(x 000 ), and so on, we get:
he first two terms in the right hand side provide the present value of choosing alternative a today and then alternative 0 forever in the future given that the current state is z. The third term in the right hand side is the difference between the value of behaving optimally in the future and the value of choosing always alternative 0. Then, given the definitions of ϕ(a, z) and δ(a, z) in the enunciate of this Proposition, it is clear that v(a, z)/ψ(x) = ϕ(a, z) + δ(a, z, P ) where:
Given these expressions, it is straightforward to show that we can obtain ϕ(a, z) and δ(a, z, P ) recursively as:
[2] Thus, v(a, z)/ψ(x) = ϕ(a, z) + δ(a, z, P ). This implies that the expression P (z) = Fε(ṽ(z)|z) can be rewritten as:
Therefore, the optimal choice probability function P is a fixed point of the mapping Ψ(P )
where Ψ(P )(z) ≡ Fε(φ(z) +δ(z, P )). This is a particular case of the fixed point probability mapping in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002) . Proposition 1(i) in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002) shows that this mapping has a unique fixed point.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4. By Proposition 3, the counterfactual probability function P * is the unique fixed point of the mapping Ψ * (P ), where
hereφ * andδ * are the functions associated with the counterfactual utility function u * (a, x, ω).
[1] Identification ofδ * . By the definition of δ in Proposition 3, we can see that this function depends on the probability distribution Fε and on the discount factor β. Since these two functions are invariant in our policy experiment, we have thatδ * (x, ω, P ) =δ(x, ω, P ) and this function is identified.
[2] Identification ofφ * : Taking into account the definition of ϕ in the proof of Proposition 3 we have that:
where T (a, z) is the term associated with the present value of the function τ . Therefore,
The function T can be obtained as the fixed point of the contraction mapping:
Since the function τ is known, it is clear that T is identified.
[3] Identification of P * . P * is the unique fixed point of the mapping Ψ * (P ), where:
e have shown that the functionsφ, T andδ are identified. Thus, given Fε, the counterfactual probability function is identified.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5. The proof proceeds in three steps. First, we show that the surplus function can be written in terms of the argumentsṽ(x, ω) and P , instead of the arguments P (x, ω) and Fε. Second, we show that the functionṽ is the unique fixed point of a contraction mapping that depends only on the identified functionsỸ and P . Finally, we
show that givenṽ,Ỹ and P we can identify Fε andφ.
[1] An alternative representation of the surplus function. The surplus function for this binary choice model is G(x, ω) = Z max {ṽ(x, ω) −ε ; 0} dFε(ε). This function depends onṽ(x, ω) and Fε. Given the one-to-one relationship betweenṽ and P , we have shown that G(x, ω) can be written in terms of P (x, ω) and Fε. Now, we show that the function can be written in terms ofṽ(x, ω) and the functionsṽ and P .
To emphasize the dependence with respect toṽ and P we write this function as G(x, ω, P,ṽ).
Associated with this surplus function we can redefine the functionδ as δ(1, x, ω) − δ(1, x, ω) where:
We also writeδ(x, ω, P,ṽ) to emphasize that this function depends onṽ and P .
[2] Fixed point mapping forṽ. The functionṽ solves the functional equationṽ(x, ω) = ϕ(x, ω) +δ(x, ω, P,ṽ). However, we cannot use this representation to identifyṽ because this fixed point mapping depends onφ that is unknown. Now, we defineṽ as the fixed point of a different mapping that is identified. Define the functionω(x) is the value of ω that solves the equationṽ(x, ω) = 0. Since the median ofε is zero, Fε(ṽ(x,ω(x))|x) = 0.5
and P (x,ω(x)) = 0.5. Therefore, we can obtainω(x) by solving the equation P (x, ω) = 0.5 with respect to ω. Therefore,ω(x) is identified on X ×ṽ(X × Ω). Remember that v(x, ω) =Ỹ (x, ω) +C(x) +δ(x, ω). Therefore, by definition ofω(x), we have thatC(x) = −Ỹ (x,ω(x)) −δ(x,ω(x)). Taking this into account we can write:
v(x, ω) =Ỹ (x, ω) −Ỹ (x,ω(x)) +δ(x, ω, P,ṽ) −δ(x,ω(x), P,ṽ)
The right hand side of this equation is the mapping Λ evaluated at functionṽ and point (x, ω), i.e., Λ(ṽ)(x, ω). Now, we show that Λ is a contraction mapping and therefore it has a unique fixed point.
To prove this we use Blackwell's sufficient conditions for a contraction (see Theorem 3.3 in Stockey and Lucas, 1989). These sufficient conditions are monotonicity and discounting.
(a) Monotonicity: We should prove that for any two functionsṽ 0 andṽ 1 such that v 1 (x, ω) −ṽ 0 (x, ω) ≥ 0 for any (x, ω) ∈ X × Ω, then Λ(ṽ 1 )(x, ω) − Λ(ṽ 0 )(x, ω) ≥ 0 for any (x, ω) ∈ X × Ω. Using the definition of the mapping Λ above, a sufficient condition for the second inequality is that G(x, ω, P,ṽ 1 ) − G(x, ω, P,ṽ 0 ) ≥ 0 for any (x, ω) ∈ X × Ω. Note that:
G(x, ω, P,ṽ 1 )−G(x, ω, P,ṽ 0 ) = P (x, ω)
Solving by parts the integral, it is straightforward to show that:
G(x, ω, P,ṽ 1 ) − G(x, ω, P,ṽ 0 ) = R ω −∞ P (x, u)du ≥ 0 (b) Discounting: We should prove that the exists some constant λ ∈ [0, 1) such that for any functionṽ, any constant c, and any (x, ω) ∈ X × Ω we have that Λ(ṽ + c)(x, ω) ≤ Λ(ṽ)(x, ω) + λc. We start obtainingG(x, ω, P,ṽ + c).
G(x, ω, P,ṽ + c) = P (x, ω) (ṽ(x, ω) + c) − R ω −∞ (ṽ(x, u) + c)
∂P (x,u) ∂ω du = G(x, ω, P,ṽ) + c P (x, ω) − c R ω
−∞
∂P (x,u) ∂ω du = G(x, ω, P,ṽ)
Therefore, there is discounting in the surplus function. Furthermore, given the definition of Λ, it is clear that Λ(ṽ + c)(x, ω) = Λ(ṽ)(x, ω), i.e., there is discounting in the mapping Λ.
[3] Identification ofṽ. The mapping Λ is identified and it is a contraction. Therefore, its unique fixed pointṽ is identified onṽ(X × Ω).
[4] Identification of Fε. The functionṽ is continuous and strictly increasing in ω. Therefore, there is an inverse functionṽ −1 (x, v) such that, for any (x, v) ∈ X ×ṽ(X × Ω), we have thatṽ(x,ṽ −1 (x, v)) = v. The model implies that P (x, ω) = Fε(ṽ(x, ω)). Therefore, it is clear that for any (x, v) ∈ X ×ṽ(X × Ω) we can obtain Fε(v|x) as P (x,ṽ −1 (x, v)). Thus, Fε is identified.
[5] Identification ofφ. We know thatφ(x, ω) =Ỹ (x, ω) +C(x) and we have shown above thatC(x) = −Ỹ (x,ω(x)) −δ(x,ω(x)). Given Fε andṽ, the functionδ is identified and thereforeC andφ are identified as well.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6. By Proposition 3, P * is the unique fixed point of the mapping Ψ * . This mapping depends on the known functions T (1, .) − T (0, .), on the discount factor β, and on the functionsφ and Fε. By Proposition 5, the functionsφ and Fε are identified given β,Ỹ , and P . Therefore, the mapping Ψ * and its unique fixed point P * are identified.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7. By definition, we have that: Time discount factor β = 0.95
Counterfactual policy
As in equation (40) with τ 0 = 0.12 p BUY τ 1 = 0.04 p BUY Age = 3, Age = 5
Sample size Cross section of 1, 000 firms
Monte Carlo replications Number of replications = 1, 000. 
